#### UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

### **UNITED STATES**

v.

## Airman JASON L. KEPHART United States Air Force

#### **ACM 37923**

#### **08 November 2012**

Sentence adjudged 4 April 2011 by GCM convened at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. Military Judge: Michael J. Coco (sitting alone).

Approved sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 7 months, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Captain Travis K. Ausland.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel Don M. Christensen and Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire.

#### Before

# STONE, GREGORY, and HARNEY Appellate Military Judges

This opinion is subject to editorial correction before final release.

#### PER CURIAM:

A general court-martial composed of military judge alone convicted the appellant in accordance with his pleas of one specification of reckless endangerment, in violation of Article 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934. The court sentenced him to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for nine months, total forfeitures, and reduction the grade of E-1. In accordance with a pretrial agreement, the convening authority approved confinement for seven months and the remainder of the sentence as adjudged. The appellant assigns as error that the specification fails to state an offense by omitting the terminal element.

Whether a charge and specification state an offense is a question of law that we review de novo. *United States v. Crafter*, 64 M.J. 209, 211 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citations

omitted). "A specification states an offense if it alleges, either expressly or by [necessary] implication, every element of the offense, so as to give the accused notice and protection against double jeopardy." *Id.* at 211 (citing *United States v. Dear*, 40 M.J. 196, 197 (C.M.A. 1994)); *see also* Rule for Courts-Martial 307(c)(3). In *Fosler*, our superior court invalidated a conviction of adultery under Article 134, UCMJ, because the military judge improperly denied a defense motion to dismiss the specification on the basis that it failed to allege the terminal element of either Clause 1 or 2. *United States v. Fosler*, 70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

While failure to allege the terminal element of an Article 134, UCMJ, offense is error, in the context of a guilty plea, the error is not prejudicial where the military judge correctly advises the appellant of all the elements and the plea inquiry shows that the appellant understood to what offense and under what legal theory he was pleading guilty. *United States v. Ballan*, 71 M.J. 28, 34-36 (C.A.A.F. 2012), *cert. denied*, \_\_ S. Ct. \_\_ (U.S. 25 June 2012) (No. 11-1394). During the plea inquiry in the present case, the military judge advised the appellant of each element of the charged offense including the terminal element, and the appellant explained how his misconduct met the requirements of the terminal element. Therefore, as in *Ballan*, the appellant here suffered no prejudice to a substantial right: he knew under what clause he was pleading guilty and clearly understood how his conduct violated the terminal element of Article 134, UCMJ.

#### Conclusion

The findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant occurred. Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c); *United States v. Reed*, 54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000). Accordingly, the findings and the sentence are

AFFIRMED.

**OFFICIAL** 

STEVEN LUCAS
Clerk of the Court

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